Paper: Why do intermediaries impose the free return policy.
Expositor: : Rodrigo Harrison, UAI
Fecha: Miércoles 08 de mayo de 2019
Hora: 13:00 horas a 14:00 horas.
Lugar: Avda. Santa Clara N° 797,
Campus Ciudad Empresarial,
Sala C-302 – Edificio Cubo
We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary y action, N-player games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under commonly known payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We provide full characterization of this equilibrium profile; players play switching strategies at different cutoff signal, order of which is directly determined by payoff asymmetry. We also provide simple examples that illustrate our result and the connection with dominance solvability. Our work extends the global game literature, which has thus far been developed for games with strategic complementarities, to new applications in industrial organization, collective action problems, finance, etc.